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Legal Disputes Related to Climate Change Will Continue for a
Century
Richard J. Pierce, Jr1

I am confident that my current students will be working on legal issues related to
climate change when they retire fifty years from now.
I. Introduction to the Problem
The average global temperature is already certain to increase by 2 degrees
Fahrenheit.2 It will increase by far more, with other major attendant changes in
climate, unless we reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases (ghgs) by at least
50% by 2050.3 The effects of failure to accomplish that daunting task will be
catastrophic. They include the deaths of millions and the displacement of scores of
millions.4 The worst effects will be experienced in places like central India and
central Africa, which will suffer extreme desertification, and in many island states,
coastal Indonesia and large portions of Bangladesh, which will be underwater. 5 The
US will suffer some significant adverse effects, however, including desertification of
much of the southwest, submersion of significant parts of Florida and Louisiana,
increases in the incidence and severity of storms of various types, 6 and a 13 degree
increase in the average summer temperature in Washington, DC.7
The task of effectively mitigating climate change is somewhere between extremely
difficult and impossible. The main problem is CO2 emissions. CO2 is by far the
most abundant ghg, and it is the inevitable byproduct of combustion of
hydrocarbons.8
While the US is the second largest source of CO2, neither the US nor the developed
world have accounted for any significant increase in emissions in several years.9
Even if the developed world were to take no steps to reduce CO2 emissions, the
developed world is unlikely to increase emissions of ghgs by any significant amount
at any time in the future because of the steady improvements in energy efficiency
that always occur over time. The increases in CO2 emissions over the last few years
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and in the future will occur almost exclusively in the developing world, with China
alone accounting for a majority of the increase.10
This trend is easy to explain. The citizens of the developing world want the kind of
goods and services that we have long taken for granted, e.g., cars and air
conditioning. As they are increasingly able to indulge those preferences, they will
increase their per capita emissions of CO2.
Reducing CO2 emissions in the developed world by 50% would not be nearly
enough to accomplish the goal of reducing global emissions by 50%. The developed
world must reduce its emissions by far more than 50% to offset the inevitable
increases in emissions in the developing world. That task is made more difficult by
the basic laws of supply and demand. Most hydrocarbons are sold on global
markets. To the extent that the developed world is successful in reducing CO2
emissions through some means, e.g., a carbon tax or subsidies for carbon-free
sources of energy, the attendant reduction in the quantity of hydrocarbons
demanded will decrease the global price of hydrocarbons. That, in turn, will
increase consumption of hydrocarbons in the developing world unless developing
countries also adopt means of reducing consumption of hydrocarbons—a step they
have not been willing to take to date. The resulting increase in consumption of
hydrocarbons in developing countries has the potential to offset 29-70% of the
reductions in hydrocarbon consumption in the developed world.11 Thus, countries in
the developed world need to reduce CO2 emissions by far more than 50% even if
countries in the developing world can be persuaded to take steps that will reduce the
otherwise dramatic rate of their increases in CO2 emissions.
While the broad outlines of the relationship between CO2 emissions and climate
change are well known, there is at least one major source of uncertainty. We do not
have a good understanding of the shape of the dose-response curve that describes
the relationship. Thus, for instance, some climate scientists believe that there is a
“tipping point” at which a given concentration of CO2 in the upper atmosphere will
have irreversible catastrophic effects on climate.12 Others believe that the doseresponse curve is roughly linear, thereby creating a situation in which each
increment of CO2 will have a roughly proportionate adverse effect on climate.13
That difference could be important for policy making purposes. If the relationship is
characterized by a “tipping point,” and we conclude that we cannot avoid exceeding
that point, we should simply accept the inevitable changes in climate and put all of
our scarce resources into devising and implementing methods of adapting to the
changes in climate. If the dose-response curve is linear, we should devote significant
resources to reducing global emissions of CO2 whether or not we believe that we can
10

Id.
Steven Stoft, Global Energy Policy Center, Renewable Fuel and the Global Rebound Effect 2 (2010).
12
See, e.g., James Hansen, Storms of My Grandchildren (2009).
13
See, e.g., OECD, Climate Change Mitigation (2008). Of course, the curve may well be linear after we
reach a tipping point.
11

2

avoid a particular concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. In that situation, we
should act on the basis of a belief that every incremental reduction is important.
The Supreme Court majority in Massachusetts v. EPA14 implicitly embraced the
assumption that there is a linear dose-response relationship between ghg emissions
and climate change. EPA argued that it was not required to regulate emissions of
CO2 from new cars in part because any such effort was unlikely to have any
meaningful beneficial effect on climate change. Total emissions of CO2 from US
autos account for only 4% of global emissions of ghgs. Moreover, even a large
reduction in emissions from new cars sold in the US would have little effect on
climate change, given the large offsetting increases in CO2 emissions in developing
countries. The majority rejected EPA’s argument on the basis that regulating CO2
emissions from new cars in the US would make a “meaningful contribution” to
climate change mitigation.15
I will indulge the assumption that the dose-response curve is linear in the balance of
this lecture, but it is merely an assumption. I do not have enough relevant expertise
to participate in the debate between the proponents of the “tipping point” theory
and those who believe instead that the relationship between ghg emissions and
climate change is linear.
II. Impediments to Climate Change Mitigation
The main impediments to effective climate change mitigation are economic and
political. Hydrocarbons are much less expensive than carbon-free alternative
sources of energy. I will focus primarily on the electricity sector, which accounts for
nearly half of CO2 emissions,16 but the economic and political impediments are
similar in the transportation and industrial sectors.17
The most recent estimates of the cost of generating electricity from various sources
in the US are: coal and gas, 4-5 cents per kwh; wind, 7-8 cents per kwh; nuclear, 910 cents per kwh, and solar, 18-22 cents.18 The cost differences between
hydrocarbons and carbon-free sources are less in Europe and Asia because coal and
gas are more expensive in Europe and Asia than they are in north america. 19
Those are estimates of generating costs only, however. Supplying electricity from
wind and solar to consumers is more costly than supplying electricity from gas or
coal for two reasons that are independent of generating costs. First, the unit cost of
transmission is higher, partly because those sources tend to be long distances from
14
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major markets and partly because they are much lower load factor sources.20
Second, both wind and solar are intermittent sources. To compare the cost of
intermittent sources with the cost of dispatchable sources like coal, gas, and nuclear,
you must either add the cost of some combination of supplemental dispatchable
sources and storage or discount the value of each unit of intermittent energy to
reflect its lower value.21 Either adjustment adds significantly to the effective unit
cost of supplying electricity generated by wind or solar to consumers. To illustrate
the effect of those adjustments, consider that the unit cost of the Cape Wind project
proposed to be constructed off of Cape Cod will be 80-85 cents per kwh after
adjusting for the lower value of the intermittent supply.22
A similar adjustment must be made to reflect the lower value of the intermittent
supplies of electricity available from solar sources, but the adjustment is lower
because the correlation between periods of high electricity demand and periods of
sunshine is better than the correlation between periods of high demand and periods
of wind velocity in the range that allows windmills to operate.23 When unit
generating costs are adjusted to reflect differential transmission costs and
intermittency, solar and wind are 3 to 15 times more expensive than coal or gas in
the US.24
The political impediments to effective climate change mitigation are primarily
derivative of the economic impediments. Four other factors add to the political
impediments, however.25 First, because CO2 remains in the atmosphere for many
decades after it is emitted, the cost of implementing mitigation measures must be
incurred many decades before the benefits will be experienced. Second, the benefits
will appear in a form that many people either do not understand or do not accept.
They will take the form of a negative—catastrophic climate effects that will be
avoided. Third, the benefits will be enjoyed disproportionately by citizens of highly
vulnerable developing countries like India and Bangladesh, while the costs will be
incurred disproportionately by citizens of less vulnerable developed countries like
the US and Germany. Indeed, many people in countries like Canada and Norway
may experience net benefits as a result of climate change. Fourth, most of the
projects that must be completed as part of the mitigation effort require regulatory
approvals that can take a decade or more to obtain. Thus, for instance, Cape Wind,
the first offshore wind farm proposed in North America, has been the subject of a
complicated and contentious regulatory approval process for over a decade.26
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III. Potential Methods of Mitigating Climate Change
A. A Carbon Tax
There is a broad consensus among economists that a carbon tax would be the most
efficient and effective means of mitigating climate change.27 A carbon tax of $50-200
dollars per ton of carbon emitted would provide a powerful incentive to engage in
research and development in the dozens of areas in which there is clear potential to
reduce CO2 emissions.28 They include wind, solar, biomass, geothermal, hydro,
nuclear, carbon capture and sequestration, storage, and the most promising,
increased energy efficiency. It is impossible to predict which of the tens of thousands
of r&d efforts will yield technological developments that will reduce CO2 emissions
significantly, but it is easy to be confident that some combination would be effective
both in reducing total consumption of electricity from all sources and in bridging
the much smaller gap that would then exist between the cost of using sources that
emit CO2 and the cost of using carbon-free or low carbon sources.
A cap and trade system of the type the US House of Representatives enacted in 2008
and the EU implemented in 1997 is functionally equivalent to a carbon tax in most
respects if the cap is low enough to be effective. The cap in the version enacted by
the House would not have been effective for many decades, if ever,29 and even the
lower cap in the EU version was far too high to be effective. The EU version of cap
and trade has produced a carbon price of $8 per ton in 2012.30 To be effective, a cap
and trade system would need to yield a carbon price of $50-200 per ton.
There is an obvious impediment to a carbon tax that is high enough to be effective
or to a carbon cap that is low enough to be effective—public aversion to taxes. The
US now has one political party that opposes all taxes and another that wants to tax
only millionaires, billionaires, and big oil companies. A carbon tax would be paid by
everyone.
B. Litigation
The US could make use of the mechanism we rely on to further many other
purposes—litigation. Thus, for instance, citizens that are, or will be, injured by
climate change could sue sources of CO2. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected
that mechanism in its 2011 opinion in American Electric Power Co. v.
27
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Connecticut.31 The Court held that the Clean Air Act displaces the power of courts
to consider actions filed by states and environmental organizations to force sources
of CO2 to decrease their emissions. In the Court’s words:
It is altogether fitting that Congress designated an expert agency, here, EPA,
as best suited to serve as primary regulator of greenhouse gas emissions. The
expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than individual district
judges, issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack the
scientific, economic, and technological resources an agency can utilize for this
purpose.32
C. EPA Regulation Under the Clean Air Act
By contrast, a majority of Justices held that EPA is required to regulate ghgs as
pollutants under the Clean Air Act (CAA) in the Court’s 2007 opinion in
Massachusetts v. EPA.33 The CAA is a poor fit for the problem, however. Most
pollutants can be regulated effectively by imposing emission limits that allow an
activity to continue at the somewhat higher cost needed to accommodate installation
of pollution control devices of some type. The most important ghg, CO2, is an
inevitable byproduct of combustion of hydrocarbons. Thus, emission limits on CO2
can be attained in most circumstances only by ceasing or reducing the activity that
yields the emissions.
EPA has taken two actions so far that have some potential to reduce CO2 emissions.
First, EPA issued a rule jointly with the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration in which it required all auto manufacturers to attain new higher
average fleet mileage requirements in the future.34 Second, EPA has proposed a rule
that would impose limits on CO2 emissions from new generating plants that are so
low that they would constitute a de facto prohibition on construction of new coalfired generating plants.35
It is not clear that either of those rules will have significant effects on CO2
emissions, however. As discussed in section IIIE, mandatory efficiency rules usually
have limited beneficial effects, and, as discussed in section IIIG, it is unlikely that
any new coal-fired generating plants will be constructed in the US even if EPA does
not issue its proposed new rule that would limit CO2 emissions from new generating
plants. Even if EPA rules issued under the CAA have some beneficial effect on CO2
emissions, their effects will fall far short of the reductions in emissions needed to
avoid major changes in climate.

31

131 S.Ct. 2527 (2011). See also Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, ___F3d ____(D.C. 2012)
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D. Smart Meters and Realtime Pricing
Both the cost and the value of electricity vary greatly from time to time. Even within
a 24-hour period, the cost of receiving a unit of electricity can vary by a factor of
twenty.36 This enormous variation is a function of several factors, including the
inability to store electricity at a reasonable cost, large temporal variations in
quantity of electricity demanded, transmission capacity constraints, and variations
in the unit cost of the generating stations that are in use.
Traditional methods of billing consumers disguise the large temporal variation in
the costs of making electricity available.37 State regulators have long required
electric utilities to bill on an average cost basis. As a result, consumers confront the
same unit cost for each unit they consume notwithstanding the large variations in
the cost of the units. Studies have shown that a shift to realtime pricing, i.e., a
system of pricing in which consumers confront the constantly changing cost of
electricity, would reduce the total cost of providing electricity by as much as 12 per
cent.38 Such a pricing system would induce consumers to change the temporal
pattern of their electricity consumption to reduce their costs. Thus, for instance,
most people would choose to operate their clothes driers and automatic dishwashers
when they can purchase electricity for 5 cents rather than 50 cents.
One of the variables that determines the cost of electricity is the mix of generating
units that are used to supply electricity at various times. During periods of high
demand, utilities must operate their peaking units. Peaking units typically have low
capital costs and high operating costs. The high operating costs of peaking units are
largely a function of their lower level of efficiency, i.e., they generate less electricity
per unit of input. The unit of input is almost always a hydrocarbon. Thus, a change
from average cost pricing to realtime pricing would reduce CO2 emissions by
reducing the quantity of hydrocarbons required to meet the total electricity needs of
the nation.
The federal government has engaged in aggressive attempts to encourage utilities
and state regulators to implement realtime pricing by, inter alia, providing federal
funds to purchase the smart meters required to implement realtime pricing. So far,
those efforts have achieved little success. Even in jurisdictions in which consumers
have federally-funded smart meters, state regulators have been extremely reluctant
to switch to a system of realtime pricing.39 The primary opposition comes from
advocates for senior citizens who fear that their constituents will pay higher
electricity bills under realtime pricing because they can not or will not change their
temporal patterns of consumption and from privacy advocates who fear that
36

Alfred Kahn, The Economics of Regulation 89-91 (1970).
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realtime pricing will provide utilities and regulators with data about the temporal
patterns of consumption of individual consumers that they will use to harm
consumers. Unless advocates for senior citizens and for privacy can be persuaded to
drop their opposition to realtime pricing, that potential method of mitigating
climate change will remain unavailable.
E. Mandatory Efficiency Requirements
For decades, the US has relied to a considerable extent on mandatory efficiency
standards to induce manufacturers, and derivatively consumers, to reduce their
consumption of hydrocarbons. Thus, for instance, the federal government has
mandated a series of constantly increasing average fleet mileage rules applicable to
auto makers and constantly increasing efficiency criteria applicable to refrigerator
makers. Efficiency standards have some potential to be of assistance in mitigating
global warming, but their beneficial effects are overstated by a significant amount
because of our failure to take into account three phenomena that have effects on all
such measures.40
First, we usually assume that efficiency would not improve in the absence of the
mandatory standards. Thus, for instance, we attribute all increases in the gas
mileage of cars to mandatory standards. That assumption is unsupportable. Even
without mandatory standards, manufacturers are driven by market forces to
improve the efficiency of the products they make. Only some unknown fraction of
the efficiency improvements are attributable to government mandates. Second,
manufacturers always game mandates in ways that reduce their efficacy. Thus, for
instance, the aggressive average fleet mileage rules issued in the 1980s induced auto
makers to cease making station wagons that qualified as cars and to substitute lower
mileage sport utility vehicles that were considered trucks.41 Third, any resulting
improvements in efficiency are offset to some extent by increased rates of utilization.
Thus, the large improvement in the efficiency of refrigerators has dramatically
increased the use of refrigerators by, inter alia, creating a situation in which most
hotel rooms have refrigerators.42
F. Subsidies and Mandates
Both the US and the EU have relied heavily on a combination of subsidies for
carbon-free sources and mandates to utilities to use carbon-free resources to
generate a specified proportion of their total electricity supply.43 Mandates are
40
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functionally indistinguishable from subsidies. They are simply subsidies that are
paid involuntarily by consumers rather than by taxpayers. Use of subsidies for
carbon-free fuels is an expensive and ineffective means of mitigating climate change.
Since the Europeans have been far more aggressive than the US in subsidizing
carbon-free sources of electricity, we can learn a lot from their experience.
Germany, Spain, and Portugal embarked on similar ambitious subsidy programs in
1997. Spain and Portugal have cut back on their efforts many times since 2008 to
reduce their adverse fiscal effects.44 Spain and Portugal lead the world in the
proportion of their electricity supply that is generated by wind. The resulting
electricity has little value, however, because it is available primarily at times of low
demand. As Paul Joskow demonstrated in his paper in the May 2011 issue of
American Economic Review, a unit of wind power is worth about one-quarter as
much as a unit of power from a dispatchable hydrocarbon source because of the
intermittent nature of wind power and its tendency to be available when demand for
electricity is low.
Germany has reduced the magnitude and scope of its subsidies for solar energy as it
has been forced to confront the high cost and limited efficacy of those subsidies.
Germany has spent $130 billion on solar subsidies.45 Those subsidies have created a
situation in which Germany now has more installed solar capacity than the rest of
the world combined.46 Solar power accounts for only 3% of the total electricity
supply in Germany, however.47 Like wind power, solar power is an intermittent low
load factor source. Germany’s solar subsidies have cost it over $1000 per ton of CO2
not emitted48—at least five times the cost of using a carbon tax to reduce emissions.
Europe’s extravagant efforts to decrease ghg emissions have had no apparent effect.
Emission in the EU and in the US decreased by about the same amount—seven per
cent—between 2007 and 2010.49
Recent studies predict similar results for other subsidy-based mitigation strategies.
Thus, for instance, the Fraser Institute estimates that Ontario consumers will pay an
average of $285 per year for its solar subsidies, with solar ultimately accounting for
only 3% of the total electricity supply in Ontario.50 RWE estimates that Prime
Minister Cameron’s plan to rely on subsidies for nuclear energy to mitigate climate
change in the UK will cost every household in the UK $12000.51
44
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G. Switching from Coal to Gas
Coal is now, and has long been, the dominant source of electricity throughout the
world.52 Replacing coal with natural gas as a generating fuel would reduce CO2
emissions from electricity generation by about 50%.53 A new application of two old
technologies—horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing—has had remarkable
effects on the supply of natural gas in the US.54 “Fracking” has created a situation
in which the US is now the Saudi Arabia of gas.55 The International Energy Agency
predicts that the US will become the world’s top gas producer by 2017. 56 The US
has already eliminated completely its reliance on foreign sources of gas and is about
to become a major gas exporter.57 Gas reserves in the US are now sufficient to
supply 100% of US demand for over a century: US gas reserves increased by the
largest amount in history in 2010.58 The price of gas in the US is now a small
fraction of the price of oil and about equal to the price of coal.
In just the past three years, the US has already replaced over ten per cent of the coal
it uses to generate electricity with gas.59 Given the new economic relationship
between coal and gas, all new fossil fuel generating plants constructed in the US are
likely to be built to operate on gas rather than coal.60 Thus, as generating plants are
replaced over time, the US is likely to eliminate completely its reliance on coal as a
generating fuel.
Fracking has the potential to yield similar effects in other regions of the world.
Geologists have identified scores of basins all over the world that contain gas-rich
shale that can support production of large quantities of gas through use of
fracking.61 Over time, fracking has the potential to increase dramatically the
quantity of gas available in Europe and Asia, with a corresponding decrease in the
price of gas to the point at which its price approximates the price of coal. 62 The
International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that global demand for gas will
increase by over 50% by 2035 and that gas will overtake coal as the dominant
source of global electricity generation by 2035.63 Over time, the gusher of new gas
supplies will reduce emissions of CO2 from the transportation sector as well as the
52
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electricity sector through a combination of direct substitution of natural gas for
gasoline and indirect substitution through cars that operate on electricity generated
with gas.64
All we need to do to realize this rosy future is to implement what IEA calls the
“Golden Rules” of regulation.65 IEA has identified a series of critical rules that
governments must apply to fracking to allow it to realize its potential with
acceptable environmental consequences. IEA estimates that implementation of the
of the regulatory rules it considers important will add no more than 7% to the unit
cost of gas produced through fracking.66 Such an increase in cost would still render
gas the cheapest source of electricity generation for the foreseeable future.67
Replacement of coal with gas can not alone achieve the daunting goal of decreasing
global CO2 emissions by 50% by 2050, but it will get us a long way toward that
goal.68
H. Reducing Black Carbon and Methane Emissions
While CO2 is the most abundant ghg, it is not the most powerful. Black carbon and
methane are many times more powerful ghgs measured on a per unit emitted
basis.69 The UN estimates that reducing black carbon and methane emissions can
yield far greater mitigation benefits than reducing CO2 emissions over the next
thirty years.70 The UN has identified 16 ways in which we can reduce black carbon
and methane emissions significantly on a cost-effective basis, e.g., by improving the
filters on diesel engines, implementing “green completions” of natural gas wells, and
reducing open burning on agricultural land.71 Each of the methods identified in the
UN report would actually yield net economic benefits in forms such as more efficient
performance of diesel engines and increased volumes of methane that can be sold by
producers.72 Moreover, implementation of the black carbon and methane mitigation
methods urged by the UN would simultaneously save 2.5 million lives per year and
increase crop production by 32 million tons per year.73
Like replacing coal with gas, reducing black carbon and methane emissions would
not be enough alone to avoid the catastrophic effects of climate change. Black
carbon and methane are powerful but relatively short-lived ghgs.74 As a result, the
beneficial effects of reducing emissions of black carbon and methane dissipate over

64
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time. Reducing black carbon and methane emissions can buy us many decades of
time in which to implement effective means of reducing CO2 emissions, however.
I. A Carbon Tax Revisited
I hope that the foregoing review of the difficulty and cost of attempting to mitigate
climate change through other means will help to persuade you that a carbon tax of
$50-200 per ton is by far the most effective and least expensive method of mitigation.
There is broad agreement that technological improvements have the potential to
render effective mitigation a goal that is attainable in a timely and cost-effective
manner. There is massive disagreement, however, with respect to the critical
question of which of the scores of technological frontiers are most likely to yield
developments that will provide opportunities to implement cost-effective means of
reducing emissions. The candidates include solar, wind, nuclear, conservation,
biomass, geothermal, electricity storage, and carbon capture and sequestration.
Moreover, each of those broad categories can be divided into countless
subcategories. Thus, for instance, there are many promising forms of solar energy
and many promising methods of storing electricity economically.
Choosing among the many candidates for major breakthroughs in cost-effective
mitigation is a fool’s errand. No one can be confident that solar or nuclear will
provide better results than wind or carbon capture and storage ten, twenty, or fifty
years from now. Implementation of a substantial carbon tax avoids the need to
engage in such a hopeless guessing game by providing the same powerful incentive
for research and development along each of those promising margins, while
simultaneously encouraging implementation of the most cost-effective means of
reducing emissions.
Economic conditions are all wrong for implementation of any new tax at present.
Once the US and global economies are performing well, and the US is willing and
able to confront the need for new revenues to reduce the present unsustainable level
of annual budget deficit, we should choose a carbon tax to further simultaneously
both our fiscal policy goals and our climate change mitigation goals. If the US leads
the rest of the world in implementing the IEA’s “Golden Rules” for regulating gas
production and the UN’s 16 methods of reducing emissions of black carbon and
methane, we can buy the time required to create the combination of political and
economic conditions that are conducive to adoption of an effective carbon tax. Once
the US adopts a substantial carbon tax, it will have the credibility to lead the rest of
the world in a new more effective round of negotiations to agree on an effective
global mitigation effort.
IV. Adaptation
Even if we achieve considerable success in our efforts to mitigate climate change,
some uncertain amount of change is inevitable. My colleague, Rob Glicksman, has
begun the crucial process of identifying the hundreds of steps we must take to adapt
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to climate change.75 Many of those steps will involve major changes in the legal
environment.
In his initial assessment of the need to adapt existing legal institutions to the
changing climate, Glicksman explains why climate change will “fundamentally
rearrange US ecosystems.”76 He then explores the many ways in which that
fundamental rearrangement will complicate existing relationships among legal
institutions and require a fundamental rethinking of the ways in which the US
allocates responsibility for management of natural resources.
Conclusion
I will end where I began. I am confident that my current students will be working
on legal issues related to climate change when they retire fifty years from now. I
hope that many of them will work on identifying and implementing effective means
of mitigating climate change. Even if they are successful in those efforts, however,
the climate will change significantly in ways to which the legal system must adapt.
Whatever path we take to address climate change, there is no doubt that climate
change will be a dominant factor in the world of law for the foreseeable future.
Every lawyer in the country will encounter climate change and its legal implications
in myriad contexts for at least a century.
Some of the legal disputes of the future will look a lot like recent disputes
with respect to the arguable need for actions by legislatures, regulators, and courts
concerning proposed renewable fuel projects, nuclear powerplants, transmission
lines, fracking operations, efficiency standards, etc. We are already beginning to see
new types of disputes, however. Thus, for instance, we are beginning to see disputes
about whether zoning boards should authorize construction of long-lived structures
on tracts of land that are likely to be completely submerged in a few decades. As
deserts and oceans expand dramatically to take increasingly large areas of land that
humans and animals have long used for various purposes, we will see hundreds of
new disputes with respect to competing uses of increasingly scarce land. Moreover,
as hundreds of millions of people in Africa, Asia and small Island States discover
that their land has either become submerged or been rendered worthless by
desertification, the US will confront major new foreign relations challenges. DOD
and CIA consider climate change a major source of future global conflicts.

75

Alejandro Carmacho & Robert Glicksman, A Multi-Dimensional Framework for Reallocating
Government Authority in Response to Regulatory Stress: The Climate Change Adaptation Example
(forthcoming).
76
Id. at ___.
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